智能電表中的篡改檢測(cè)與保護(hù)

　　智能電表中的篡改檢測(cè)與保護(hù)

　　智能電表可以極大的靈活性，優(yōu)化能源使用，但也可以通過(guò)竊取額外的機(jī)會(huì)竊取電力。除了其脆弱的舊形式的物理篡改，這些設(shè)備面臨更復(fù)雜的黑客攻擊形式。工程師、防篡改的智能電表的設(shè)計(jì)可以建立在一個(gè)廣泛的廠商包括模擬設(shè)備，Atmel，F(xiàn)reescale半導(dǎo)體、集成，恩智浦半導(dǎo)體，脈沖電子，意法半導(dǎo)體的設(shè)計(jì)方法和先進(jìn)的設(shè)備，德克薩斯文書(shū)，其中。

　　據(jù)業(yè)內(nèi)人士分析，每年的電力盜竊達(dá)近900億美元，全球有超過(guò)一半的發(fā)生在世界新興市場(chǎng)，包括印度，巴西和。同時(shí)，電力盜竊是一樣古老的電表本身，并借鑒了各種方法，改變米和它的輸入，企圖影響電表的能量測(cè)量。

　　For example， traditional analog utility meters were notoriously susceptible to relatively simple physical attacks （Figure 1）。 Typically， energy thieves would break into the meter to affect the measurement mechanism itself or use magnets to confuse the current sensing mechanism – typically resulting in a falsified reduction in measured usage by 50% to 75%. Another common form of tampering involved simply bypassing the meter entirely or switching wires on the utility side of the meter to cause the rotor disk to rotate in the opposite direction – decrementing wattage counters to falsely indicate lower energy usage. In a similar tampering approach， the neutral wire would be removed to stop rotor movement and halt the counters entirely. Typically， energy thieves would remove evidence of tampering during the day to avoid detection by utility workers.